1	4.5 percent that obtained for awhile and then the
2	5 percent that obtained for a shorter period of time
3	were excessive when imposed? At any time during the
4	period of their imposition?
5	A Those are two different questions.
6	Q Yeah, they are.
7	I'll take them one at a time if you wish.
8	A When imposed I haven't attempted to
9	rollback and and confront myself with the evidence
10	that the Commission had, but certainly on the first
11	go-around, the 4-1/2 seemed broadly consistent with
12	experience to that date and with prospects for
13	California and with the world in which rapid competitive
14	inroads were not anticipated.
15	So, again, I haven't attempted to redo that
16	and to say how would I have decided.
17	But looking back in the course of this, the
18	4-1/2 adopted around the turn of the decade did have a
19	stretch, I think, but but was not was not out of
20	bounds.
21	My own reading was that is that adding a
22	half a percent later on, in light of subsequent
23	decisions and events, I find difficult, frankly, to
24	understand.
25	And I haven't attempted to read the decision
26	in great detail to understand it, but the portions I've
27	read, that that seems excessive in light of available
28	evidence.

1	Q And I take it just in general the concern here	
2	is the effect on Pacific's ability to earn a reasonable	
3	return on its investment?	
4	A Broadly. Although, of course, we are not	
5	doing rate-of-return regulation. And so, the issue of	
6	excessive really can't be entirely separated from time	
7	period. What makes the 4-1/2 and the 5 particularly	
8	high is the compounding, the fact that you have to	
9	outperform under those, the nation, by a high multiple	
10	each and every year.	
11	But the ultimate concern is for the viability	
12	and in fact the ability of the enterprise to raise	
13	capital for necessary investments going forward.	
14	MR. STOVER: At this time, your Honor, I would like	
15	to make a bench request and reserve an exhibit number	
16	for the article, as I recall from the discussion with	
17	Mr. Brown, the September 22nd Wall Street Journal	
18	article to which the Professor was alluding during his	
19	answers to Mr. Brown.	
20	ALJ REED: Would you be able to make that	
21	available?	
22	THE WITNESS: Sure. My copy has some marginal	
23	notes on it. I was also referring, I must say, to some	
24	tables published by UCLA.	
25	ALJ REED: That were included in the article?	
26	THE WITNESS: No. I obtained them from Pacific.	
27	They were produced well, they say UCLA-PBBEFP	
28	forecast. No. These say September '95. So I looked at	

1	a couple of these sheets from UCLA as well as the
2	article.
3	MR. SASSER: Your Honor, we can certainly provide a
4	copy of the article tomorrow.
5	MR. STOVER: And if we could reserve an exhibit
6	number for that. At the close of Pacific's evidence, I
7	move the admission of that along with
8	Professor Schmalensee's testimony.
9	ALJ REED: Mr. Stover, I want to be clear, you do
10	not want these other underlying tables or charts?
11	MR. STOVER: I'm being prompted by my colleagues
12	here, your Honor, to ask for and insist upon the
13	remaining items, but I would appreciate if we could mark
14	those separately.
15	ALJ REED: Mark the tables that underlie it
16	separately?
17	MR. STOVER: Mark the tables that he referred to in
18	his answer separately from the Wall Street Journal
19	article.
20	ALJ REED: Okay. Is that possible, Mr. Sasser?
21	MR. SASSER: We will obtain copies of those, your
22	Honor.
23	ALJ REED: Okay. Let me preliminarily give you an
24	identification number for that exhibit. For the
25	article, tentatively that will be Exhibit No. 3.
26	(Euclide No. 2 man annual for
27	(Exhibit No. 3 was reserved for identification.)
28	ALJ REED: And the underlying data will be

1	identified as Exhibit No. 4.
2	(Pakikis Na. 4 ang mang 4 San
3	(Exhibit No. 4 was reserved for identification.)
4	MR. FABER: Your Honor, the date of this article is
5	September the 22nd?
6	ALJ REED: Yes.
7	MR. STOVER: May I approach the bench, your Honor?
8	ALJ REED: Yes.
9	MR. STOVER: I am asking my colleague to hand out
10	to the other parties, and I am handing to you and the
11	reporter, certain data responses.
12	Q Do you have the data responses that
13	Pacific Bell supplied to you?
14	A No.
15	MR. SASSER: Do you have an extra copy?
16	MR. STOVER: We have limited numbers, but you will
17	certainly get yours, and I will give one to the
18	witness.
19	ALJ REED: Mr. Stover, do you want me to mark this
20	for identification as Exhibit No. 5?
21	MR. STOVER: Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
22	Charles No. 5 and and the
23	(Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification.)
24	MR. STOVER: Q Looking at what's been marked for
25	identification as Exhibit 5, Professor, were these data
26	responses directed to your testimony prepared by you or
27	under your supervision?
28	A Treviewed them As I sit here I don't know

ı	whether they were prepared by Pacific or prepared by
2	Dr. Tardiff. But I do believe I reviewed all these
3	before they went out.
4	Q You would adopt these as answers responsive to
5	questions regarding your testimony, would you not?
6	A Yes.
7	MR. STOVER: With that, your Honor, I would move
8	the admission of Exhibit 5.
9	ALJ REED: Any objection?
10	(No response)
11	ALJ REED: Exhibit No. 5 will be received into
12	evidence.
13	(Eyhikit No. 5 mag agained into
14	(Exhibit No. 5 was received into evidence.)
15	MR. STOVER: Thank you. With that, I will let
16	Professor Schmalensee off the hook. I'm finished.
17	ALJ REED: Ms. O'Reilly.
18	CROSS-EXAMINATION
19	BY MS. O'REILLY:
20	Q Good afternoon.
21	A Good afternoon.
22	Q Reviewing Attachment 2 to Exhibit 1, your CV
23	including your various professional roles and
24	publications, I wonder if during the period from 1974 to
25	1990 you ever expressed a professional opinion or
26	submitted proposals on any of the public policy
27	discussions on the deregulation of the savings and loan
28	industry?

1	A To the best of my recollection, no. 1
2	certainly didn't study it, and I don't believe I was
3	involved in any way that I can now recall.
4	Q Some of your publications during that
5	time frame, by title, would suggest that you might have
6	touched on it, and likewise, some work you did for the
7	Federal Reserve Board later with respect to banking
8	issues.
9	A I am happy to discuss any particular ones that
0	suggest that. I don't think I did. My work with the
1	Federal Reserve Board was just a consultant on broad
2	issues of banking merger.
3	Q So you never had occasion to analyze proposals
4	for the deregulation and subsequent reregulation of the
5	savings and loan industry based on economic principles?
6	A I know I attended one or two seminars on the
7	issue when I was in the government. By the time I got
8	to Washington in '89, the main legislation had been
9	passed. I didn't have primary responsibility for the
20	Bush administration banking reform proposals. So I was
21	in conversations at a few meetings, but no serious
22	analysis.
23	Q In your testimony you favorably describe much
24	of Professor Kahn's analysis of basic principles of
25	economics?
26	A Yes.
27	Q And specifically, I direct your attention to
28	the bottom of page 6 of Attachment 2 to Exhibit 1 which

1	continues on to the top of page 7 which reads in part:
2	"Professor Kahn has warned that
3	'recent experience clearly suggests
4	that the mixed system (competition
5	and regulation) may be the worst of
6	both possible worlds."
7	Are you familiar with what position
8	Alfred Kahn as the architect of the airline deregulation
9	under the Carter Administration took with respect to
0	what was the proper mix, in his view, between
1	competition and regulation in that industry?
2	A Gee, I am fairly familiar with the details of
3	that episode. If he said anything he said initially,
4	I thought, that you had to proceed carefully. He then,
5	in retrospect, said that that was an error.
6	I don't know the details of positions he
17	adopted beyond that.
8	Q Based on the four rules described as "few and
9	simple" on page 8 of that attachment, do you know in
20	Professor Kahn's opinion when there have been sufficient
21	emergence of competition in the airline industry to
22	suggest that these four principles were being met?
23	A The sense that Professor Kahn and, I might
24	add, every economist I knew at the time had was that
25	competition, that that industry was inherently a
26	competitive industry and that the structural conditions
27	were in place to cut over to competition.
28	So I guess I'm not sure that I know his

1 position well in detail. But the general view was 2 certainly after Senator Kennedy's hearings in '75 and 3 related events that the evidence was on the table that 4 was necessary to justify a move to competition. 5 And as the first witness at that Kennedy 6 hearing, I am very familiar with Dr. Kahn's testimony 7 and wonder are you aware that an underlying assumption 8 of Dr. Kahn and Senator Kennedy was that small airlines 9 would expand the feeder routes, including PSA in 10 California, Peoples Express in New York, and other small 11 airlines and more efficiently service the intrastate 12 markets while the large airlines would continue to 13 service the hubs and the large traffic routes, that that 14 was an underlying assumption why competition would work 15 well inherently in the airline industry if it were 16 deregulated? 17 I think that was the general sense of what 18 would happen in that industry. It shows the difficulty, 19 of course, of forecasting the effects of competition. 20 I was startled to hear you describe that once 21 the barriers to entry in the airline industry were 22 removed, that entry occurred rather rapidly, that there 23 were increased entrants after deregulation. 24 I thought what I said was that -- well, that 25 particular market entry was sufficiently easy. I don't 26 know if I did, I didn't intend to say, that entry to the 27 industry was that easy, although it was relatively 28 easy. There was entry, and there was exit.

1	Q Is it your view that following deregulation,
2	there was expanded entry into the airline industry
3	rather readily?
4	A I guess I don't understand the question.
5	There hadn't been new trunk entry in forever. There was
6	entry after deregulation. So by definition, there was
7	expanded entry. I don't know what you mean by "expanded
8	entry readily," or whatever the phrase was.
9	Q Isn't it a fact that shortly after the federal
10	legislation was enacted, that Congress removed the price
11	controls on jet fuel and that in fact almost immediately
12	after airline deregulation carriers such as Peoples
13	Express, PSA and other airlines actually went out of
14	business and other airlines merged, but the number of
15	entrants was reduced immediately following deregulation,
16	not expanded because an underlying assumption of
17	deregulation never was brought to fulfillment when it
18	came to barriers of entry?
19	MR. SASSER: Your Honor, I am going to object to
20	that question as being a compound question. And in
21	addition, what I am beginning to see on these questions
22	is a lot of assumptions of facts that are not in
23	evidence.
24	Dr. Schmalensee is not testifying as to
25	deregulation of the airline industry. And what we're
26	getting here is testimony in the form of questions.
27	These are not facts that have been established in
28	evidence, nor has a proper foundation been laid to ask

1 Dr. Schmalensee questions that assume these facts as 2 being in evidence. 3 ALJ REED: Will you respond to Mr. Sasser. 4 MS. O'REILLY: I will attempt with hopefully two 5 questions to establish a foundation, although I think 6 one has been established based on this witness' repeated 7 references to airline deregulation as examples of the 8 success of Dr. Kahn's philosophy on broad economic 9 principles. 10 ALJ REED: Okay. And you will reduce your compound 11 question into smaller questions. 12 MS. O'REILLY: In the interest of time, I was trying to combine them, but let's start again. 13 14 Q Would you agree that Dr. Kahn's reputation was 15 largely the result of his efforts as the architect of 16 airline deregulation? 17 I think that is his public reputation. Within 18 the economics profession, it probably rests more on his 19 two-volume work on the economics of regulation which was 20 written before his involvement in airline deregulation 21 and which is what is cited here. 22 Do you generally conclude that airline 23 deregulation was successful? 24 Α Yes. 25 0 And did you state in your earlier testimony 26 that it was your opinion that the number of entrants 27 into the airline industry expanded as a result of 28 airline deregulation?

l	A Before deregulation there was no entry. After
2	deregulation there was entry. It expanded, yes. I
3	don't know how else to put that. That is very simple.
4	Q Certainly there were new airlines that came
5	into being before deregulation was authorized by the
6	CAB?
7	A New interstate trunk carriers?
8	Q Over a period of time as they received
9	licensing, yes?
10	A Between
11	MR. SASSER: Excuse me. There is no question
12	pending.
13	THE WITNESS: Sorry.
14	MS. O'REILLY: Q What is the basis of your
15	conclusion that the number of entrants in the airline
16	industry all right. We will drop that. But if you
17	have any information that draws a relevant analogy
18	between airline deregulation and the proposals in this
19	proceeding, I will certainly like an opportunity to
20	cross-examine you on them.
21	MR. SASSER: There is no question pending, your
22	Honor. Counsel has made a statement.
23	MS. O'REILLY: Q What specific documents have you
24	reviewed in preparation for your testimony?
25	MR. SASSER: I am going to object to that as overly
26	broad.
27	MS. O'REILLY: Q Specifically, have you reviewed
28	Pacific's monthly monitoring reports as filed with this

1	Commis	ssion?
2	Α	I have not reviewed Pacific's monthly
3	monitor	ing reports.
4	Q	Have you reviewed their annual reports?
5	Α	I think I may have seen pieces, but not
6	systema	tically.
7	Q	Have you reviewed the order I 93-02-028 which
8	was the	Pacific Telesis spin-off case proceeding?
9	Α	I don't recall having seen any pieces of
10	that.	
11	Q	Do you recall having reviewed any of the
12	docume	ents that were prepared and submitted subsequent to
13	that pro	sceeding, specifically the financial report and
14	complia	ance report?
15	Α	Related to the spin-off proceeding?
16	Q	Correct.
17	Α	I don't believe so.
18	Q	What TS LRIC data specific to Pacific have you
19	reviewe	ed in preparation for this case?
20	Α	I haven't reviewed any specific TS LRIC data
21	since I	haven't cited any.
22	Q	You have stated in the testimony on page 25 of
23	Attachr	nent 2 to Exhibit 1, the last full paragraph,
24	second	sentence:
25		"Presently, basic residential
26		access is well below cost."
27		Could you describe what evidence you are
28	basing	that conclusion on?

l	A It is my understanding, and I did review the
2	portion of the relevant decision, that it was the
3	Commission's intent that basic residential access be
4	priced below fully distributed cost.
5	I inquired of Pacific personnel whether basic
6	residential access was below incremental cost. I was
7	told that it was. I was not given specific data. So I
8	am relying on Pacific for the comparison with
9	incremental cost.
10	Q And who specifically at Pacific provided you
11	with that information?
12	A I confess, it came to me secondhand. I asked
13	Dr. Tardiff to contact Pacific. And I don't know for a
14	fact with whom he spoke. I think we addressed this, I
15	think it was addressed in response to a data inquiry,
16	but I don't recall. I don't know that I know a name. ]
17	Q Are you aware that in the Universal Service
18	docket, the Commission's rules have called for the
19	development of a TS LRIC cost study to determine
20	precisely whether and to what extent basic service
21	prices are covering costs?
22	A I am not following that docket, so I was
23	unaware of that specific requirement.
24	Q I would ask that in the absence, therefore, of
25	any data to substantiate that statement, that it be
26	stricken from his testimony.
27	MR. SASSER: Your Honor, he stated very
28	specifically that he relied upon a Commission's decision

1 for reference; that's the IRD decision. 2 In addition, he pointed out that he inquired 3 of Pacific as to whether or not there were -- it was 4 below incremental, and Pacific had actually responded to 5 that question and given him that information. 6 I can give your Honor, if you like, a cite to 7 the decision where it specifically does come to that 8 conclusion. 9 MS. O'REILLY: Well, I understand that decision to 10 have established that as a goal; and that in fact the 11 subsequent Commission decision to have this cost study 12 developed is so that that question can be answered and 13 that, therefore, this Commission has not taken a 14 position as to whether or not at this time basic residential services are being priced below cost. 15 16 MR. SASSER: I disagree. I think that the 17 Commission states in its decision -- and we can pull the 18 cite to the decision --19 ALJ REED: All right. Mr. Sasser, let's pull it 20 out. 21 MR. SASSER: -- very specifically. 22 ALJ REED: Okay. 23 MR. SASSER: If you would give me a moment, 24 please. 25 ALJ REED: Yes. Off the record. 26 (Recess taken) 27 ALJ REED: On the record. 28 MS. O'REILLY: Q This morning, in response to a

- question from Ms. Burdick, you testified that your conclusions with respect to the cost of basic service were based on TS LRIC studies; is that correct?
- 4 A I may have said it. It now appears, on
- 5 refreshing my memory, I shouldn't have said it. But I
- 6 may have said -- I did say TS LRIC. I shouldn't have.
- 7 Q This afternoon, you've testified that your
- 8 information with respect to the cost of basic service
- 9 was provided to you by Mr. Tardiff, correct?
- 10 A Particularly as regards to incremental costs,
- 11 yes.
- 12 Q Did Mr. Tardiff inform you that in the
- 13 Commission order with respect to the OANAD proceeding,
- 14 that they have ordered the development of TS LRIC
- studies to be produced in January of 1996?
- 16 A I didn't ask him, but he didn't tell me.
- 17 Q Did Mr. Tardiff inform you that the cost
- 18 studies relied upon by the Commission in their IRD
- decision were based on 1989 data?
- A I was not aware of that.
- 21 MR. SASSER: Your Honor, if I might, I'll place the
- 22 citations that we talked about earlier into the record.
- 23 ALJ REED: Okay.
- MR. SASSER: The relevant discussion in the IRD
- 25 decision appears on page -- mimeo page 45. And that's
- 26 Decision 94-09-065 in which the Commission stated that
- 27 it was setting the basic exchange service rate at
- one-half of fully allocated costs.

1	In addition, as Professor or, rather,
2	Dr. Smalensee, testified, Pacific informed him that the
3	incremental cost of basic service was well above the
4	basic service basic exchange service rate. And the
5	data for that appears in that proceeding in
6	Exhibit 670-A, page B-6, which was the cost testimony of
7	Rick Scholl.
8	ALJ REED: Thank you, Mr. Sasser.
9	MS. O'REILLY: In light of the fact that could
10	we go off the record?
11	ALJ REED: Off the record.
12	(Off the record)
13	ALJ REED: On the record.
14	Off the record, we have had a discussion about
15	the portion of Dr. Smalensee's testimony that
16	Ms. O'Reilly was questioning him on.
17	Mr. Sasser, of course, has pointed to some
18	language within the latest IRD decision, which speaks to
19	residential rates being below cost.
20	Ms. O'Reilly is questioning the cost studies,
21	the accuracy of the cost studies, since they are based
22	on much earlier year data and pointing out that in the
23	OANAD proceeding, the company, and that tentative
24	conclusion, will be put to the test as to whether or not
25	they are below cost and by exactly how much, or whether
26	or not they are at or above cost.
27	There is a request to strike that portion, or
28	have amended Dr. Smalensee's testimony referring to

1	that. I have determined that there isn't any need for
2	that, that at least for my purposes and the Commission,
3	we're aware of what the status is of those earlier cost
4	studies and what the future objective is with respect to
5	making the cost studies much more accurate for the
6	future. Okay?
7	MS. O'REILLY: Okay.
8	Q Professor Schmalensee, I'm wondering what the
9	basis for your conclusion that price caps are not
10	necessary for Category 2 services is based upon in light
11	of the fact that you have not investigated which
12	services are in Class 2 or the rationale for their
13	placement in that category?
14	MR. SASSER: No question pending.
15	MS. O'REILLY: Yes. I'd asked what the basis was
16	for his conclusion.
17	MR. SASSER: That's rephrasing it. Okay.
18	THE WITNESS: Well, let's be clear. Where I make
19	that recommendation on the bottom of 28, I preface it
20	with the sentence, quote:
21	"A tentative determination of the
22	specific services that fit this
23	description would require a
24	service-by-service evaluation."
25	I then offer, as plainly a tentative assertion
26	that:
27	"Price protection should be
28	limited to Category 1 because those

1	are the monopoly, nondiscretionary
2	services."
3	I don't offer that as a firm view, and indeed
4	Pacific's proposal doesn't go that far, doesn't remove
5	price protection from Category 2.
6	So this is by way of a tentative look ahead, I
7	suppose, as a way to characterize it.
8	MS. O'REILLY: Q So do I understand that your
9	recommendation would fall short of recommending at this
10	time that price caps be removed for Category 2
11	services?
12	A Oh, at this time. I tried to make it clear, I
13	don't think I know enough to go that far.
14	I think I know enough to say that that's a
15	question worth looking at, and that's what this intends
16	to do. But I was focused in this testimony primarily on
17	Pacific's proposal, which doesn't remove price
18	protection from Category 2, but retains price ceilings
19	at existing levels.
20	Q In response to a question posed by
21	Ms. Burdick, you said that mandating a productivity
22	target at a 2 percent level would, in fact, result in
23	annual automatic increases of one percent for prices
24	regardless of any cost considerations; is that correct?
25	A That is assuming a 3 percent rate of inflation
26	and a 2 percent productivity and contrary to
27	Pacific's, if you will, preferred proposal retention
28	of the formula, that would mandate nominal increases of

1	one percent annually and, of course, a real decrease of	
2	2 percent.	
3	Q Have you considered the public policy	
4	implications of such automatic price increases	
5	regardless of the status of competition in that	
6	particular market?	
7	A I'm sorry; the public policy implications of a	
8	nominal one percent price increase and a 2 percent	
9	decrease.	
10	Q Without regard for services for which there is	
11	no competition?	
12	A One normally thinks in terms of levels rather	
13	than in terms of rates of change. I would prefer	
14	Pacific's proposal, which, on its face, is more generous	
15	to consumers of stable prices rather and Pacific	
16	bears the inflation risk rather than the proposal of the	
17	2 percent increase.	
18	But you can't consider levels in isolation	
19	I'm sorry rates of change in isolation.	
20	The current prices, I gather, are relatively	
21	low by national standards. And neither of those	
22	proposals unless there's something dramatic going on	
23	elsewhere would alter that.	
24	Q In response to another question from	
25	Ms. Burdick that related to potential oligopoly and	
26	duopoly players, you indicated that you anticipate	
27	competition would develop in most markets.	
28	Could you identify in what markets you do not	

l	anticipate competition developing?
2	A I'd have to hear the specific question. But I
3	believe, as I indicated in response if not to that
4	question but to others, I haven't done a detailed study
5	of the likely scope of competition, that being beyond
6	the scope of my testimony.
7	MS. O'REILLY: That's all I have.
8	ALJ REED: Thank you, Ms. O'Reilly.
9	Ms. Grau.
10	CROSS-EXAMINATION
11	BY MS. GRAU:
12	Q Dr. Schmalensee, I'm Janice Grau representing
13	the Division of Ratepayer Advocates. I just have a few
14	questions.
15	You testified earlier you had difficulty
16	understanding the addition of 50 basis points to the
17	X factor in the last decision regarding the last
18	triennial or the first triennial review; is that
19	correct?
20	A Yes. I didn't read the entire record.
21	I did read the portion of the decision, and on
22	that basis, found it hard to see where the 50 basis
23	points came from.
24	Q All right. Did you read the proposed decision
25	in that proceeding?
26	A I thought I just read the final. I don't
27	Q All right. In the proposed decision, and the
28	recommendation was for an X factor of 6 percent

1	A I do not believe I read the decision with an
2	X factor of 6 percent in it.
3	Q All right. Given the what you know of the
4	record from reading the decision, would you have found
5	6 percent to be unreasonable?
6	A Based on, again, not having tried to do this
7	exercise except doing it on the fly as I sit here,
8	6 percent would have seemed to me high, sort of beyond
9	the existing TFP studies. And even 5 percent seemed to
10	rely on an expectation of an acceleration of
11	productivity growth that didn't seem to me to have a
12	firm basis in at least the materials that I saw cited.
13	So 6 percent would have also been, I would
14	have thought, unreasonable.
15	Q To your knowledge, had Pacific had any trouble
16	raising capital during the period it's been under
17	incentive regulation?
18	A I haven't studied the question. I'm not aware
19	of any difficulties, but I simply haven't done the
20	inquiry.
21	MS. GRAU: Those are all the questions I have.
22	Thank you.
23	ALJ REED: Thank you, Ms. Grau.
24	Mr. Golabek, did you have any clarifying
25	questions?
26	MR. GOLABEK: No, nothing at this time.
27	ALJ REED: Okay. Thank you.
28	Mr. Schmalensee, I just have a couple

1	questions for you.	
2	EXAMINATION	
3	BY ALJ REED:	
4	Q When you speak of Pacific's preferred	
5	proposal, your testimony speaks of the proposal being	
6	requested for an indefinite period of time; is that	
7	correct?	
8	A I don't know if I if I used that language,	
9	but that's certainly the nature of the proposal; yes,	
10	ma'am.	
11	Q Do you have any sense of what Pacific views a	
12	an indefinite period of time?	
13	A I think the problem is and I would add	
14	parenthetically this is certainly something I've had	
15	discussions about the problem that your Honor faces	
16	and that we all face is that this proceeding is part of .	
17	a larger whole.	
18	And what makes sense to think about doing by	
19	way of, say, any sort of commitment to price stability	
20	has got to depend importantly on what happens in the	
21	other arenas.	
22	I would interpret this I don't know whether	
23	Pacific's willing to make the commitment but I would	
24	think of this certainly as a commitment to stability	
25	until there's some sense of what's happening in those	
26	other arenas when, you know, questions of adjusting	
27	rates and putting in place subsidy mechanisms and so	
28	forth, when those issues are addressed.	

1	Then I would think just in the nature of all
2	this, Pacific would certainly look hard at: Could it
3	promise stability; Would it need adjustment.
4	The Commission would in the nature of it want
5	to look at: Is stability enough; Should they be
6	decreasing; Should they be increasing.
7	So I it's inevitably indefinite, but I
8	think it's this is so linked to the other proceeding
9	that I I personally think of this stability
10	commitment as implicitly fairly short term, potentially
11	long term, but conditional.
12	Again, I've tried to avoid telepathic
13	assertions here. So
14	Q I appreciate that.
15	Dr. Schmalensee, are you aware that Pacific's
16	recommendations in this proceeding are very similar to
17	recommendations that they made in the initial NRF
18	proceeding?
19	A I wasn't aware of their initial
20	recommendations. No.
21	Q I don't know if you are the right person to
22	ask this; and, if not, then you can refer me to a proper
23	Pacific witness.
24	I note in your testimony that while you state
25	the three issues that the Commission was concerned
26	about, that you focused primarily, understandably, on
27	the first one, which allowed Pacific to kind of
28	explore

1	Α	(Nodding head)
2	Q	its primary proposal and then consider the
3	modific	ation suggestion of the question.
4		It seemed as if you spoke somewhat to Issue
5	No. 2?	
6	Α	(Nodding head)
7	Q	I'm curious about Issue No. 3.
8		I noted, well, that it didn't appear in your
9	testimo	ny
10	A	(Nodding head)
11	Q	the direct testimony; and in your reply
12	testimo	my there seemed to be a somewhat dismissive air
13	in resp	onding to the proposals and recommendations of
14	the oth	er parties that addressed the issue.
15		Could you speak to that just a little bit?
16	Α	Yes, your Honor. I'm sorry if it appeared to
17	be disn	nissive, but I mean those are able people making
18	serious	proposals,
19		I guess the reason for it, and what's implicit
20	here, is	that this change makes sense now.
21		While it is logically consistent with, and a
22	good fi	irst step toward, a more competitive regime, it's
23	also a	sensible change without going down that road.
24		Whether you could judge whether 5 percent
25	is unre	asonably high or unreasonably low or whatever,
26	and sin	nilarly for 2 percent.
27		In large part not exclusively, but in large
28	part, w	rithout thinking about future changes in the

I	market, this testimony isn't written contingent on
2	competition's taking the field.
3	It talks about the existing impact on
4	intraLATA toll but doesn't presume for its validity a
5	lot of local exchange competition.
6	That's the reason there's an implicit "no"
7	to three being given here as regards this proposal.
8	Now, discussions about conditions of entry and
9	dealing with entry barriers (indicating) those are
0	important considerations but not, in my view, here.
1	The things to be considered about, you know,
2	what does this Commission want to do to move toward
3	local competition and to be assured that it's possible
4	and so forth, what does it want to have accomplished or
5	have before it before it grants increased pricing
6	flexibility?
7	I those are serious questions. Those are
8	good questions.
9	But they don't, to my mind and this is
0.	probably where the dismissive tone comes from they
1	don't, to my mind, have much to do with the issues
2	addressed in my testimony or in the testimony of the
3	other Pacific witnesses or the proposal made. That's
4	the reason.
.5	Q Okay. And I guess that's where my question
26	goes.
27	Was it that you were not assigned to look at
8.	that issue?